Abstract
From a philosophical standpoint, it is unclear precisely what medical gaslighting is, how it presents, its conditions for success, and how it is differentiated from the more popular interpersonal interpretation of gaslighting. My project aims to remedy this lacuna by developing an account of medical gaslighting as distinguished from that in strictly interpersonal relationships. My approach consists of first exploring the importance of developing a philosophical account of medical gaslighting and providing five criteria that a sufficient account must meet. I then analyze and appraise two accounts of ordinary gaslighting by Kate Abramson and Carla Bagnoli and argue that neither account accurately explains the features and characteristics of medical gaslighting. Further, I describe the key characteristics and identifiable features that make up my account of medical gaslighting. I also address the moral implications of medical gaslighting and argue that it involves two distinct moral harms: the primary moral harm undermines a patient's agency, and the secondary moral harm causes moral injury to doctors. Finally, I call for institutional reform by discussing the policy implications resulting from developing an accounting of medical gaslighting. By developing and identifying the specific nature of medical gaslighting, we will be better equipped to understand patients' experiences and aim toward better quality care.
